This is additional material from the "cutting room floor." Originally, we thought of including examples of extremely successful scientists as a way of wrapping up chapter 1, Science. Here is our short biography of one such successful psychologist, Elizabeth Loftus.
Elizabeth Loftus currently holds joint faculty appointments. She is distinguished professor of psychology and social behavior at the University of California-Irvine and is affiliate professor of psychology and law at the University of Washington. Loftus received her BA from UCLA in 1966 and her PhD from Stanford in 1970. She began her academic career at New School University in 1970. From 1973 till the present she has worked at the psychology department at the University of Washington. In 1984, she began to serve as a law professor there too. In 2002, she was named distinguished professor at the University of California- Irvine as well (where she spends most of her time). Loftus is the author of 18 books and more than 250 articles. She has served on many editorial boards and as officer of several professional associations including the presidency of the American Psychological Society. She has also served as an expert witness on human memory in hundreds of legal cases.
At age 14, Loftus lost her mother to a drowning accident. To this day she believes that event marks a profound division in her life. Ever since that day, Loftus has seen herself as an agent for helping others. As an undergraduate at UCLA, she excelled at both math and psychology. Like Robert Sternberg, she attended Stanford and studied psychology. She married Geoffrey Loftus in graduate school. After graduating, he went to work at the University of Washington and she followed a year later (turning down an assistant professorship at Harvard to do so). Their marriage lasted 23 years, “...an accomplishment...” according to Loftus, given her work ethic. They are still friendly. Loftus fell into her first major research topic, eyewitness memory, because she wanted her research to have practical applications, and it has.
Early in her academic career (around 1972), Loftus was studying memory using pictures as stimuli. After a conversation with a man who had been convicted of killing someone in self–defense she began to use films of accidents as experimental stimuli. What she found surprised her. The participants who viewed the films gave her different answers depending on how she phrased the questions she asked them. The relationship between leading questions and eyewitness memory became her first major research project. She found that leading questions influenced eyewitness memory and that a large percentage of eyewitnesses (in her lab) insisted they had seen something that, in fact, they had never seen. They had, however, heard that thing mentioned while being questioned in an intentionally leading manner. For example, nearly 20% of participants claimed to have seen a barn in one of her films. In reality, there was no barn and only those who had been earlier asked a leading question about the non-existent barn claimed to have seen it. In 1999, the United States Department of Justice published guidelines on gathering eyewitness testimony in criminal investigations that stemmed directly from Loftus’ research. Those recommendations call for law–enforcement personnel to avoid the use of leading questions and to place only one suspect in a line-up. Loftus’ eyewitness reliability research has been called one of the best examples of how psychological research can affect public policy (Foxhall, 2000).
Later, Loftus began to study the difference between repressed memories and false memories. Repressed memories are true memories that have become unconscious for a time and then re-appear. Repressed memories of child abuse are a common example. However, some memories that appear to be repressed are not true, they are false memories. Although false memories are not true, the person believes them to be true. After observing a link between some therapists and the subsequent revelation of incriminating memories by their patients, Loftus demonstrated that false memories could be induced in a small percentage of individuals (See Chapter 3 for a more complete discussion of this research.). Her research ignited a legal and psychological controversy. Because of the large number of criminal cases based upon repressed memories, Loftus began to testify as an expert witness on human memory at hundreds of trials including those of the Hillside Strangler, O. J. Simpson, Rodney King, the Menendez brothers, and the Oklahoma City bombing. Her success in defending people accused of crimes like murder and child–molestation has created enmity from prosecutors, their witnesses, and even the public. Because of her research, her public appearances often require security personnel to be present. Her work has caused her hardship and grief while also bringing her fame and prestige. Recently, she was named as one of the top 100 most eminent psychologists of the 20th century (and the top ranked woman) putting her in the company of Freud, Skinner, and Piaget.
Reference
Foxhall, K. (2000). Suddenly, a big impact on criminal justice. Monitor on Psychology, 31 Retrived September 8, 2006 from http://www.apa.org/monitor/jan00/pi4.html
Sunday, June 22, 2008
Tuesday, June 10, 2008
Theory in Biology
One of the early drafts of chapter 1 addressed the issue of theory in biology (a little) more deeply than the final draft of the book:
Smith gives four ways in which biological theory is different from physical theory. He also points out that none of the following features of biological theory are common in physics. Let's looks at the four features one by one.
1. Contingency: Smith uses contigency in a way similar to replication. He notes that unlike in the physical sciences, it is impossible to repeat the results of evolution by "replaying the tape." In fact, nearly everyone agrees that were the Earth to undergo a replay of the last 5 billion or so years the results would be very different. Those differences, of course, don't come from evolution or its mechanisms. (In fact, evolution itself is a product of our natural history. In any replay, there is no guarantee that evolution itself would again emerge. The smart money, most likely, would be against such a re-emergence.) Instead, the differences in the replay would come from unforeseen and unpredictable events such as meteorite impacts and other catastrophes.
2. Memory: To Smith, memory encompasses the creation of systems that can reliably reproduce the information contained within them. That mechanism, of course, is carried out by RNA and DNA and is quite remarkable in its ability to reproduce the information and to act upon the results of that information. Smith notes just how difficult it is to create memory systems that have survived for millions of years.
3. Control: In control, instructions mostly flow in one direction with incomplete feedback. In biological systems, natural selection functions as one controlling process. Only a few biological designs survive to reproduce themselves. In systems created by humans control is necessary too. However, we have had little luck as yet in constructing control systems able to repair and maintain themselves. In contrast, living systems can repair and maintain themselves while they are alive.
4. Individuality: Evolution and genetics end up creating unique individuals composed of common elements. Our 30,000 genes are shuffled to create individuals who are all different (excepting identical twins). The odds of two individuals sharing the same genetic components are incredibly small, on the order of 1 in 70 trillion. Smith notes that sheer numbers prevent biologists from looking at individuals. Instead, they seek out underlying "regularities" in living systems such as the citric acid cycle.
Biology, thus, has a different set of scientific questions than does physical or social science. One of the most profound of its questions is how life emerged from non-living processes. The nature of biology forces its theorists to adopt different modes of theorizing. Like social scientists, biologists, too, must seek their own ways to create theories and not simply ape the physical sciences.
- "Unfortunately, the nature of biological and social science is such that it is impossible to simply apply physical science’s way of theorizing to them. In biology, the problem is that natural history plays a major role. All life on Earth evolved. It is simply not possible to experiment with living systems as it is with physical systems. In social science, the main problems are consciousness and the sheer number of possible causal variables. Neither biology nor social sciences have discovered any laws similar to those of the physical sciences. Even Darwin’s theory of evolution is basically a historical account coupled with a small handful of causal mechanisms such as common descent, natural selection, sexual selection, and gradualism. In psychology, the search for ideal theories of behavior has been unsuccessful and has led to modifications to ideal theory."
- "The success of physical science and its theories has been so spectacular that biologists and social scientists naturally tried to imitate them. However, theories in biological science and social science differ considerably from the ideal theories in physical science. Unfortunately, the nature of biological and social science is such that it is impossible to simply apply physical sciences's way of theorizing. Neither biology nor social science has yet discovered any laws as universal as those of the physical sciences (p. 26-27)."
Smith gives four ways in which biological theory is different from physical theory. He also points out that none of the following features of biological theory are common in physics. Let's looks at the four features one by one.
1. Contingency: Smith uses contigency in a way similar to replication. He notes that unlike in the physical sciences, it is impossible to repeat the results of evolution by "replaying the tape." In fact, nearly everyone agrees that were the Earth to undergo a replay of the last 5 billion or so years the results would be very different. Those differences, of course, don't come from evolution or its mechanisms. (In fact, evolution itself is a product of our natural history. In any replay, there is no guarantee that evolution itself would again emerge. The smart money, most likely, would be against such a re-emergence.) Instead, the differences in the replay would come from unforeseen and unpredictable events such as meteorite impacts and other catastrophes.
2. Memory: To Smith, memory encompasses the creation of systems that can reliably reproduce the information contained within them. That mechanism, of course, is carried out by RNA and DNA and is quite remarkable in its ability to reproduce the information and to act upon the results of that information. Smith notes just how difficult it is to create memory systems that have survived for millions of years.
3. Control: In control, instructions mostly flow in one direction with incomplete feedback. In biological systems, natural selection functions as one controlling process. Only a few biological designs survive to reproduce themselves. In systems created by humans control is necessary too. However, we have had little luck as yet in constructing control systems able to repair and maintain themselves. In contrast, living systems can repair and maintain themselves while they are alive.
4. Individuality: Evolution and genetics end up creating unique individuals composed of common elements. Our 30,000 genes are shuffled to create individuals who are all different (excepting identical twins). The odds of two individuals sharing the same genetic components are incredibly small, on the order of 1 in 70 trillion. Smith notes that sheer numbers prevent biologists from looking at individuals. Instead, they seek out underlying "regularities" in living systems such as the citric acid cycle.
Biology, thus, has a different set of scientific questions than does physical or social science. One of the most profound of its questions is how life emerged from non-living processes. The nature of biology forces its theorists to adopt different modes of theorizing. Like social scientists, biologists, too, must seek their own ways to create theories and not simply ape the physical sciences.
Sunday, June 8, 2008
Constraints to Theory in Social Science
In chapter 1 (page 26) we begin our discussion of theories in science by first describing the ideal theories of physical science. In the text, we characterize those theories as "laws of nature" and show how they seek laws that explain physical phenomena universally. Thus, the Second Law of Thermodynamics or the Law of Gravity work on Earth and everywhere else.
Upon re-reading The Arrow of Time, I noted that Layzer described laws and constraints thusly:
Initial conditions will constrain much of what a social science theory can explain or what interventions can be made to a social system. My colleague, Tommy Milford (a social worker), is especially sensitive to the description and implementation of initial conditions in his work because he realizes how important initial conditions are. Well thought out interventions, for example, may fail if they are applied without regard to initial conditions.
In physical science, boundary conditions may reflect a number of possible solutions, typically associated with different, corresponding differential equations. In social science, however, boundary conditions are more likely to be akin to the natural boundaries we describe in law-oriented theories (p. 28). Law-0riented theories are highly restricted by those naturally-occurring boundaries so that, for example, theories in cognition are not likely to shine much light on the area of personality. Furthermore, theories that attempt to address issues is such disparate areas are likely to be weaker than theories that stick to their knitting within their natural boundary conditions.
The discovery of symmetry in physical science is key to any argument for universality. If phenomenon is symmetrical, then it is true regardless of the observer's point of view. In social science, questions of symmetry revolve (again) around natural boundaries. We speak of gender, culture, class, and race as examples such natural boundaries (or symmetries). Social science data that transcend those boundaries are more universal than data that are not. Often, (think of culture) we are unable to break out of the prison imposed by our asymmetrical view of the world, often leading to tragic results. (Assuming, for example, that American troops would be greeted as liberators.)
To conclude, considering initial conditions, boundary conditions, and symmetry conditions is important in social science theorizing. The real world often imposes those constraints. Failing to see them or to account for them can lead to deficient theorizing.
Upon re-reading The Arrow of Time, I noted that Layzer described laws and constraints thusly:
- "Laws and constraints are complementary aspects of the physicist's description of nature. Laws describe the regularities underlying phenomena; they are few in number and each applies over a wide domain. Constraints serve to select from the set of all events governed by a given law the particular phenomenon of interest. The laws define what is possible, the constraints what is actual or relevant. (p. 58-59)"
Initial conditions will constrain much of what a social science theory can explain or what interventions can be made to a social system. My colleague, Tommy Milford (a social worker), is especially sensitive to the description and implementation of initial conditions in his work because he realizes how important initial conditions are. Well thought out interventions, for example, may fail if they are applied without regard to initial conditions.
In physical science, boundary conditions may reflect a number of possible solutions, typically associated with different, corresponding differential equations. In social science, however, boundary conditions are more likely to be akin to the natural boundaries we describe in law-oriented theories (p. 28). Law-0riented theories are highly restricted by those naturally-occurring boundaries so that, for example, theories in cognition are not likely to shine much light on the area of personality. Furthermore, theories that attempt to address issues is such disparate areas are likely to be weaker than theories that stick to their knitting within their natural boundary conditions.
The discovery of symmetry in physical science is key to any argument for universality. If phenomenon is symmetrical, then it is true regardless of the observer's point of view. In social science, questions of symmetry revolve (again) around natural boundaries. We speak of gender, culture, class, and race as examples such natural boundaries (or symmetries). Social science data that transcend those boundaries are more universal than data that are not. Often, (think of culture) we are unable to break out of the prison imposed by our asymmetrical view of the world, often leading to tragic results. (Assuming, for example, that American troops would be greeted as liberators.)
To conclude, considering initial conditions, boundary conditions, and symmetry conditions is important in social science theorizing. The real world often imposes those constraints. Failing to see them or to account for them can lead to deficient theorizing.
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